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This article analyzes the empowerment and disempow-
erment of credit rating agencies (CRAs) as private regu-
latory intermediaries. Until the recent financial crisis, 
regulators heavily relied on private credit ratings to 
impose risk-sensitive requirements on financial market 
actors (targets). Regulatory use of credit ratings was 
instrumental in empowering CRAs because regulatory 
authority was delegated to them and their own private 
power was bolstered by public endorsement. But regula-
tors’ subsequent efforts to disempower the CRAs—more 
recently regarded as dysfunctional “runaway” intermedi-
aries—have proven costly, complicated to do, and hardly 
consequential in limiting CRAs’ de facto power. This 
dynamic reveals a path-dependent power shift in favor of 
private intermediaries that is more pronounced (1) the 
larger the intermediary’s own sources of power when an 
RIT arrangement is established, (2) the larger the trans-
fer of authority to the intermediary, and (3) the longer 
regulators rely on the intermediary.
Keywords: credit rating agencies; regulatory interme-
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Credit rating agencies (CRAs) are powerful actors in global financial market govern-
ance. Even after the latest global financial cri-
sis, which spurred broad-based allegations that 
CRAs lacked reliability and integrity and led to 
pledges to reduce “overreliance on CRAs” 
(Partnoy 2009; see Hill 2011; Pagliari 2012; 
Porter 2010), a small number of private rating 
firms continue to determine costs of borrowing 
and access to capital for public and private 
debtors. Investors still follow CRAs’ standard of 
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creditworthiness, and even strong sovereign states zealously seek to preserve 
their top ratings. This article draws on and enhances the RIT framework to 
explain how CRAs could rise to such arguably excessive power, and what makes 
CRAs’ power so persistent.
The case of CRAs underlines the value-added of the RIT model as outlined by 
Kenneth Abbott, David Levi-Faur, and Duncan Snidal (this volume) for under-
standing the power of private third-party governors (see also Galland; Loconto; 
Lytton; van der Heijden, this volume). To capture the persistent power of CRAs, 
it is crucial to retrace how the regulatory use of credit ratings in the United States 
and elsewhere constituted CRAs as regulatory intermediaries (I). CRAs fulfilled 
risk-assessment functions on behalf of public regulators (R), which allowed the 
latter to impose risk-sensitive, ratings-dependent requirements on financial mar-
ket actors (targets, T). Regulatory use was instrumental in empowering CRAs 
because it entailed the delegation of regulatory authority1and bolstered CRAs’ 
own private sources of power with public endorsement (Bruner and Abdelal 
2005; Kerwer 2005; Nölke 2004; Partnoy 2009; Sinclair 2005).
But regulators that initiate public-private schemes of indirect governance 
while sitting in the driver’s seat may not stay there in the longer run. As the RIT 
arrangement endures, power may shift from the regulator toward the intermedi-
ary. In the case of CRAs, regulators’ post–financial crisis efforts to disempower 
CRAs by stopping the regulatory use of credit ratings have proven complicated 
and hardly effective. CRAs’ power persists despite costly private governance 
failures and regulators’ efforts to regain control over their dysfunctional and 
unaccountable “runaway” intermediaries (Hill 2011; Kruck 2016).
This article advances the original RIT model by proposing a path-dependent 
power shift (PDPS) approach that explains when and why significant shifts of 
power in favor of private intermediaries2 will occur, thus constraining regulators’ 
attempts to disempower runaway private intermediaries. Combining principal-
agent, private authority, and historical-institutionalist perspectives, I argue that 
(1) the larger the private intermediary’s own sources of power when an indirect 
governance arrangement is established, (2) the larger the transfer of regulatory 
authority to the private intermediary, and (3) the longer regulators rely on this 
intermediary, the more costly and difficult it will be for regulators to disempower 
the runaway intermediary. As I elaborate below in theory and empirics, these 
variables are not merely additive but interact to produce (more or less) pro-
nounced power shifts in favor of incumbent intermediaries. They do so via mate-
rial as well as ideational mechanisms of path-dependence, that is, progressively 
increasing resource dependence of the regulator and normalization and 
NOTE: I am very grateful to Ken Abbott, David Levi-Faur, and Duncan Snidal for their excep-
tional enthusiasm, commitment, and support throughout the RIT project and for their detailed 
and constructive comments on this article. I also thank Bernhard Zangl, Berthold Rittberger, 
Jonas Tallberg, an anonymous reviewer, and the participants of workshops in Jerusalem, 
Barcelona, and London for their helpful criticism and suggestions. Special thanks go to David 
Levi-Faur and the Leonard Davis Institute for hosting the 2014 “Politics of Regulatory 
Intermediaries” workshop at The Hebrew University of Jerusalem. 
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legitimation of reliance on the intermediary, both of which constrain radical 
departures from paths of intermediary empowerment.
I illustrate how the PDPS approach can make sense of power dynamics in RIT 
schemes that could not be fully captured by any one of the PDPS approach’s 
components alone in an “analytical narrative” that retraces the asymmetric roles 
states have played in empowering and disempowering CRAs (see Büthe 2002). 
However, the PDPS approach should be relevant for analyzing a lot of RIT 
schemes beyond CRAs for three reasons.
First, most indirect modes of regulation involve some (varying amount of) 
empowerment or endorsement of the intermediary by the focal regulator as cap-
tured by theories such as principal-agent or, alternatively, orchestration theory 
(Abbott et al. 2015; see Lytton, this volume, for a network perspective). Second, 
intermediaries often have or develop their own capacities and sources of author-
ity; so we need theories of private authority that take intermediaries’ capacities 
and authority into account alongside the regulator’s actions. Third, most RIT 
arrangements are designed to last, favoring the emergence of institutional path-
dependencies and calling for a dynamic theoretical perspective on how RIT 
schemes develop over time. Comparative statics accounts of R → I → T relations 
fail to draw an accurate and complete picture of their evolution. More adequate 
models recognize the role of history, regulatory path-dependence, and institu-
tional legacies in explaining (variation in private) intermediaries’ power to shape 
regulatory outcomes (see Farrell and Newman 2010; Mattli and Seddon 2015).
If these presumptions and the PDPS approach are empirically on the mark, 
path-dependent power shifts, limiting regulators’ ability to disempower interme-
diaries, will be a pervasive feature of RIT arrangements. Further research should 
seek to rigorously test PDPS and compare successful and unsuccessful attempts 
of intermediary disempowerment to empirically determine the conditions under 
which different outcomes will arise.
In the remainder of this article, I first develop the PDPS approach. I then 
analyze how the constitution of CRAs as regulatory intermediaries enhanced 
their power. After that, focusing on the U.S. regulatory setting, I retrace how 
regulators have sought to cut back CRAs’ power following the financial crisis by 
rescinding their delegated authority, but have largely failed in this endeavor. 
Rescinding delegated authority is difficult for regulators, because after decades 
of extensive reliance on CRAs regulators have become dependent on CRAs’ ser-
vices, for which there are few (effective) substitutes (see van der Heijden, this 
volume, for a similar argument on increasing dependence on intermediaries). 
Moreover, even if rescinding were possible, it would now have few consequences 
for CRAs’ de facto power, because—at least partly due to their regulatory 
empowerment—CRAs have become strongly embedded in private capital mar-
ket practices and structures. This makes disenchanted regulators focus on incre-
mental reregulation and shored-up oversight of CRAs. But, paradoxically, 
reregulation may further solidify CRAs’ authority, as it institutionally inscribes 
CRAs as legitimate and perfectible governance actors, rather than mere purveyors 
of opinions or providers of mundane services. I conclude by highlighting a broader 
“intermediary selection dilemma” that follows from the PDPS argument.
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A Dynamic and Synthetic Approach to the Public  
(Dis-)empowerment of Private Intermediaries
Prevailing theories of indirect modes of governance—most notably principal-
agent theory (see Green 2014; Hawkins et al. 2006; Tallberg 2002)—and theories 
of private authority (see Cutler, Haufler, and Porter 1999; Green 2014; Hall and 
Biersteker 2002; Nölke 2004; Sinclair 2005) tend to either overplay or underplay 
the role of public regulators in (dis-)empowering private governors while neglect-
ing the importance of path-dependence and endogenous shifts of power in 
dynamic RIT settings.
By contrast, the PDPS approach to the study of private regulatory intermedi-
aries takes into account both the effects of public empowerment—that is, the 
depth of delegation and public endorsement emphasized by principal-agent 
theory—and the extent of intermediaries’ own private sources of power stressed 
by researchers of private authority. Moreover, drawing on insights of historical 
institutionalism (Farrell and Newman 2010; Mahoney 2000; Pierson 2000), the 
PDPS approach captures how history, previous institutional choices, and the 
duration of RIT schemes matter. Last but not least, historical-institutionalist rea-
soning helps us to theorize how (1) intermediaries’ own sources of power, (2) 
regulatory empowerment, and (3) the longtime institutional entrenchment of 
RIT arrangements propel material (i.e., progressively increasing resource 
dependence) and ideational (i.e., normalization and legitimation) mechanisms of 
path-dependence that underlie the evolution of RIT schemes and drive power 
shifts in favor of the intermediary.
Public (dis-)empowerment and private sources of power
Principal-agent theory offers important insights into the reasons for delega-
tion, the sources of agency losses, principals’ design of control mechanisms and 
their opportunities for recontracting, all of which are important for analyzing the 
(dis-)empowerment of private intermediaries. Even proponents of private 
authority (Cutler, Haufler, and Porter 1999; Hall and Biersteker 2002; Nölke 
2004; Sinclair 2005), who are critical of such a “stubbornly state-centric” view 
(Cutler, Haufler, and Porter 1999, 16), acknowledge that state acquiescence or 
recognition is (at least) a permissive basis for private authority (Cutler, Haufler, 
and Porter 1999, 19).
Yet this position underplays the direct and indirect empowering effects of 
delegation to and endorsement of (private) intermediaries. State support—mate-
rial and immaterial, direct or indirect—matters for the performance and power 
of private authorities (Genschel and Zangl 2014). Public empowerment and rec-
ognition add additional sources of delegated authority to private intermediaries’ 
resource endowments and may contribute to intermediaries’ expanding their 
independent power, multiplying (not merely adding to) their power resources for 
example by giving them legitimacy and/or a regulatory privilege vis-à-vis nonem-
powered competitors.
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From the perspective of principal-agent theory, the extent of the initial delega-
tion of authority is a major determinant of the intermediary’s postdelegation 
power (Mattli and Büthe 2005). with regard to private regulatory intermediaries 
and CRAs more specifically, the extent of delegated authority may vary depend-
ing on: the number and significance of public regulations that reference credit 
ratings, the range of targets of ratings-dependent regulation, the scope of regula-
tory purposes and functions outsourced to CRAs, and the more or less compul-
sory character that (obtaining) a certain rating may have for targets. But 
principal-agent theory holds that, no matter their extent, delegations of power 
are revocable: intermediaries can be reined in and disempowered by the 
regulators.
Principal-agent theory underestimates the autonomy of private intermediaries 
and overestimates the ability of state principals to discipline them through a mix 
of carrots and sticks (Mattli and Büthe 2005). Public recognition and empower-
ment (i.e. delegation) put private intermediaries “in authority,” providing an 
important source of power. By contrast, social recognition of private actors as “an 
authority” may be boosted by public endorsement, but is not wholly contingent 
on it. Many private governance actors are private authorities not only by the 
grace of the state, but also due to their own sources of authority (such as specific 
knowledge, expertise, or representational skills) and also to coercive structural 
power.
what is important is that the capacities and power resources of (potential) 
intermediaries significantly shape the attractiveness of delegating to them in the 
first place; at the same time, they also render private intermediaries autonomous 
and resilient toward states’ (later) attempts to control them and circumscribe 
their behavior. Private intermediaries, in particular, may not depend on resources 
provided by the regulator, and neither their economic viability nor their political 
power need be solely based on delegated authority (Mattli and Büthe 2005, 
403–5). As highlighted by recent research on “orchestration” as a horizontal, soft 
mode of indirect governance (Abbott et al. 2015), relationships between public 
regulators and private intermediaries that possess considerable resources of their 
own may be considerably less hierarchical and characterized by different prob-
lems and mechanisms of control than principal-agent models assume.
we would expect that the greater the autonomous resources of private inter-
mediaries, and the stronger their genuinely private sources of power, the less 
hierarchical will be the relationship between public regulators and private inter-
mediaries, and the more difficult it will be for regulators to maintain or regain 
control over them. As a result, the (threat of) rescission of authority will be less 
consequential for intermediaries’ actual power.
Path-dependencies and public disempowerment
Both principal-agent and private authority theories offer comparative statics 
views of the development of RIT schemes. But as proponents of historical insti-
tutionalism have long pointed out, institutional reproduction and change occur in 
a path-dependent manner: previous institutional choices impact regulators’ range 
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of viable choices in the future (Mahoney 2000; Pierson 2000). Past regulatory 
choices—which have empowered private intermediaries and institutionalized 
their position in a governance structure—narrow future paths for their disem-
powerment. Later disempowerment, even in the form of (re-)internalizing pri-
vatized governance tasks (i.e., a return to RT regulation), is not impossible; but it 
becomes more costly, more difficult, and less consequential in terms of curbing 
intermediaries’ actual power vis-à-vis targets. Principal-agent and private author-
ity variables shape the strength of path-dependence: The more extensive the 
initial delegation, the more private sources of power the intermediaries possess 
and bring into the R-I-T arrangement; and the more prolonged the regulatory 
reliance on private intermediaries, the more pronounced will be the material and 
ideational dynamics of path-dependence.
Continued and large-scale reliance of regulators on the capacities of interme-
diaries generates significant material path-dependencies in terms of progressively 
growing resource dependence and increasing returns from continued enlistment 
of the intermediaries. The more limited the capacities of regulators to internalize 
previously outsourced functions and the greater their dependence on the govern-
ance resources of the intermediary (such as expertise, access to targets, credibil-
ity, or material means), the more constrained regulators will be in disempowering 
incumbent intermediaries.
Regulators’ resource dependence is determined by two dimensions: the essen-
tiality and the substitutability of the resources controlled by the intermediary 
(Kruck 2011, 97–98; Pfeffer and Salancik 2003, 46–51). Essentiality describes the 
extent to which regulators require the resources controlled by the intermediary 
to attain their regulatory goals. Substitutability denotes the extent to which 
resources provided by the intermediary can be replaced from other—intermedi-
ary or “in-house”—sources (see Mattli and Seddon 2015). A high degree of 
resource dependence exists when the resources demanded by a regulator and 
controlled by a particular intermediary are characterized by high essentiality and 
low substitutability. Under these circumstances, radical rescission to disempower 
incumbent intermediaries will be unlikely.
The key point of the material path-dependence mechanism is that gaps in 
regulators’ capacity to (re-)internalize governance functions and their dependen-
cies on the resources of incumbent intermediaries tend to progressively grow as 
intermediary engagement endures and becomes extensive, with this dependence 
representing one of the “darker sides of intermediation,” as van der Heijen (this 
volume) puts it. Long-term and extensive reliance on particular resource-strong 
intermediaries predisposes regulators (and depending on the regulatory roles of 
the intermediary, also targets) to neglect the maintenance or buildup of capaci-
ties that could readily substitute for intermediary resources. Moreover, regulators 
may become vested in particular governance tools for which intermediaries’ 
resources are essential. The costs of exiting the path of continued reliance on 
regulatory intermediaries therefore increase over time, whereas the relative ben-
efits of continued large-scale reliance on intermediaries grow.
High (low) levels of regulators’ reliance on intermediaries lead to strong (weak) 
increasing returns and great (little) dependence on private intermediaries. As a 
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result, public regulators that have long and extensively relied on private intermediar-
ies will prefer to avoid a radical recentralization of governance tasks. Rather, they will 
seek to shift tasks and authority to other intermediaries. If the supply of alternative 
intermediaries is scarce, that is, if incumbent intermediaries are not substitutable by 
alternative intermediaries, they will focus on reregulation of the incumbent 
intermediary.
Increasing essentiality and decreasing substitutability of intermediary resources 
are general trends in public-private RIT schemes. These dynamics will be more 
or less pronounced depending on properties of the regulator (strong or limited 
capacity at the outset of the RIT scheme), the market for intermediaries (a small 
or large number of intermediaries), and problem-situational contexts. with 
regard to the latter, highly technical environments characterized by uncertainty, 
complexity, and rapid rates of change create particularly high demands on public 
regulators trying to keep up with private intermediaries (see Mattli and Büthe 
2005; Mattli and Seddon 2015) and nurture their own capacities to internalize 
outsourced governance functions.
Besides these material dynamics, self-reinforcing ideational normalization and 
legitimation mechanisms that render transfers of public authority sticky also 
complicate later disempowerment of private intermediaries. Public authorization 
of and reliance on private intermediaries generates ideational path-dependencies 
bolstering intermediaries’ authoritative status in the eyes of the regulator and/or 
the target. The more regulatory roles and authority are transferred to intermedi-
aries, the more this fosters the normalization and legitimation of reliance on 
them, which then turns into a normalized behavior. Public regulatory recognition 
enhances the private, for example, epistemic authority of intermediaries to a 
point where it is hard to cut it back by formal regulatory action. This implies that 
authority shifts are sticky and hard to effectively reverse even if the formal rules 
of the game are rewritten.
Bringing these propositions of principal-agent, private authority, and historical 
institutionalist theories together in a dynamic and synthetic framework, the 
PDPS approach predicts that: (1) the larger the private intermediary’s own 
sources of power when an indirect governance arrangement is established, (2) the 
larger the transfer of regulatory authority to the private intermediary, and (3) the 
longer regulators rely on this intermediary, the more costly and difficult it will be 
for regulators to disempower the runaway intermediary. Path-dependent power 
shifts favoring the intermediary in the RIT arrangement will then be extensive.
The Empowerment of CRAs as Intermediaries
CRAs are powerful and controversial governance actors (Kerwer 2005; Sinclair 
2005). Conceiving them as regulatory intermediaries within the RIT framework 
helps us to better understand why. Both the properties of CRAs themselves and 
the effects of public empowerment affect governance outcomes.
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The properties of CRAs
CRAs are private firms that estimate and rate the credit-worthiness of borrow-
ers—such as firms, insurance companies, banks, municipalities, and sovereign 
states—and financial instruments—including bonds, loans, and structured 
finance products such as collateralized debt obligations (Cutler, Haufler, and 
Porter 1999, 10–11). CRAs collect dispersed information on the financial situa-
tion of borrowers and the default risk of financial products and condense it into 
a single measure of relative credit risk—a credit rating in the form of a letter 
grade. These credit risk assessments are published and used widely for making 
investment decisions (Cantor and Packer 1994, 1).
As commercial firms, CRAs have no inherent concern for the collective good 
of financial stability, let alone for effective financial market regulation. Credit 
rating is first of all a business with high profit margins. The credit rating and risk 
advisory branches of Moody’s reported total revenues of $3.5 billion in 2015, with 
profits (net income) well beyond $900 million. Even in the (post-)crisis years, 
Moody’s experienced impressive growth rates—in 2008 its total revenues were 
“only” $1.8 billion (white 2010, 216).
CRAs’ business model shapes their behavior as intermediaries and compro-
mises the effectiveness and integrity of ratings-based financial regulation. Around 
80 to 95 percent of CRAs’ overall income stems from fees for “solicited” ratings. 
Since the 1970s, issuers, that is, borrowers, rather than investors have paid CRAs 
for solicited ratings. This issuer pays business model shapes R → I → T relation-
ships in ways that are undesirable for R, since it contributes to a conflict of inter-
est and a problematic closeness of I to T rather than to R (see also Galland; 
Loconto; Lytton, this volume). Because issuers pay for their services, CRAs have 
been overly responsive to targets, leading to “rating grade inflation.” In the run-
up to the financial crisis, CRAs were happy to be captured by issuers, that is, their 
clients and targets (Brunnermeier et al. 2009; Hill 2011). This “capture via the 
intermediary” (see Abbott, Levi-Faur, and Snidal, this volume) contributed to 
flawed ratings, costly governance failures, and alienation from R’s interests, turn-
ing CRAs into dysfunctional and unaccountable “runaway” intermediaries.
CRAs themselves argue that their business viability is contingent on their 
reputation for quality, expertise, objectivity, and independence. This inhibits 
them from giving inappropriately lenient grades to their clients. However, the 
validity of this reputational asset argument depends—along with factors such as 
transparency of rating methods and data, legal accountability, and business 
model—on competition among multiple intermediaries in the rating industry, a 
condition that has been absent in real rating markets. Competition has been fur-
ther undermined by the empowerment of CRAs as regulatory intermediaries, 
since regulatory recognition has primarily benefitted the incumbent big players. 
Moody’s, S&P, and Fitch (the Big Three) have a combined global market share 
in credit ratings of 95 percent (white 2010, 216–17).
Complicating matters further, it is not clear that increasing the number of eligible 
intermediaries, that is, shoring up competition in the rating market, would actually 
discipline CRAs against capture and increase the quality of ratings. As the targets pay 
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CRAs, greater competition might even increase incentives to please clients, driving 
CRAs into even worse behavior in a race to the bottom (Darbellay 2013; Hill 2011; 
see Abbott, Levi-Faur, and Snidal, this volume). At any rate, proclaiming that the 
market should and will discipline CRAs, while undermining market competition by 
regulatory empowerment (and arguably postcrisis reregulation; see below), is not a 
sound or consistent strategy for regulators.
Enlisting CRAs as intermediaries
Although the goals and interests of public regulators and private CRAs differ 
substantially, regulators have found it expedient to harness CRAs’ risk assessment 
activities for a variety of regulatory purposes. These include imposing risk-sensi-
tive investment restrictions on financial institutions, defining differential disclo-
sure requirements, and adjusting capital reserve requirements to credit risk 
exposures (Kerwer 2005, 463; Sinclair 2005, 42–45). Regulatory use of credit 
ratings constitutes CRAs as regulatory intermediaries (I) fulfilling risk-assess-
ment functions on behalf of public regulators (R), allowing the latter to impose 
risk-sensitive, ratings-dependent requirements on financial market actors (T):
R (e. g., SEC, BCBS, EU3) → I (recognized CRAs) → T  
(banks, institutional investors, insurers) 
CRAs as intermediaries affect the behavior of targets by (co-)defining a stand-
ard of credit-worthiness and measuring compliance with it, thus determining the 
level of regulatory burden (Kerwer 2005). Rather than designing uniform risk-
insensitive regulations or assessing credit risk themselves (both R → T), or even 
leaving risk assessment to targets (R → I = T), regulators implicitly transfer the 
task of risk assessment to CRAs. Although they do not explicitly require CRAs to 
conduct governance activities that they would otherwise not undertake, public 
regulators expect CRAs to act on their behalf as if they had explicitly ordered 
them to do so. In a politically naïve view, regulators simply take a free ride by 
using rating services that CRAs would provide in any case. As elaborated below, 
however, enlisting selected CRAs (called in the United States “nationally recog-
nized statistical rating organizations” or NRSROs) as regulatory intermediaries 
has profound impacts on their behavior and power.
The risk-assessment activities of CRAs and the regulatory use of credit ratings 
contribute to the implementation of regulatory policies: general rules about, say, dif-
ferential capital requirements for different levels of credit risk exposure are clarified 
and specified through the assignment of specific credit risk ratings, which result in 
the calculation of a target-specific, temporally variable amount of required capital 
reserves. CRAs are also engaged in monitoring targets’ performance in terms of 
credit risk exposure and risk management even though the “issuer (target) pays” busi-
ness model of CRAs raises well-founded doubts about the credibility and reliability 
of CRAs as monitors (Brunnermeier et al. 2009; Hill 2011).
The main reason for regulators to rely on CRAs as intermediaries has been 
CRAs’ operational resources and expertise in the measurement of credit risk 
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(Kruck 2011). Regulators considered these resources increasingly essential for 
adequate (i.e., risk-sensitive) financial regulation under the uncertain and volatile 
conditions of globalization and liberalization; at the same time, regulators have 
lacked these capacities and found them costly to develop. Reliance on credit rat-
ings from CRAs offered a cost-effective and convenient way to continually adapt 
the regulatory requirements imposed on financial market actors to their current 
exposure to credit risk, measured in terms of credit ratings (Bruner and Abdelal 
2005, 192–93; Pagliari 2012, 48).
Ratings-based regulation in the United States dates back to 1930s’ New Deal 
regulations. However, only in the 1970s did ratings-dependent regulations become 
wide-spread. The breakdown of the Bretton woods system of fixed exchange rates 
(1973) and the ensuing deregulation and globalization of financial markets led to an 
exponential increase in the volume of transnational flows of capital. This contributed 
to the rise of new market actor constellations, financial products, and processes that 
increased the complexity, volatility, and systemic uncertainty of financial markets. As 
a result, in the decades until the global financial crisis, regulators became increas-
ingly reliant on CRAs’ operational resources and expertise. The number and scope 
of U.S. regulations that referenced CRAs increased significantly.
By the onset of the crisis, credit ratings were of central importance to financial 
market actors in all sectors, including banks, insurers, pension funds, mutual 
funds, broker-dealers, and others. In 2004, at least eight federal statutes and 
some fifty federal regulations, along with more than one hundred U.S. state laws 
and regulations, referenced CRAs’ ratings as a benchmark in financial regulation. 
Delegation of regulatory authority was thus extensive, because regulatory use of 
credit ratings occurred in a large absolute number of rules; affected diverse 
financial market actors in securities, banking, and insurance markets; was 
employed for multiple regulatory purposes; and implied numerous compulsory 
requirements that targets could not otherwise fulfill.
CRAs’ operational capacities and expertise are more relevant in liberal market 
economies such as the United States than in coordinated market economies such 
as Germany or France, due to differences in the number and diversity of borrow-
ers, the average complexity of the prevalent financial products, and the relative 
volatility of financial markets (Kruck 2011, 139–44). Nonetheless, in the decades 
before the crisis, the regulatory use of credit ratings gradually spread around the 
world (Kerwer 2005; Sinclair 2005, 42–44).
The 2004 Basel II Accord provided for external measurement of credit risk by 
recognized CRAs as one of two methodologies for determining banks’ capital 
reserve requirements. Sophisticated transnational banks, keen on using their own 
internal ratings procedures, and industry groups in Europe—especially small and 
medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), which feared heightened financing costs and 
competitive disadvantage—vehemently lobbied against an extensive regulatory 
role for CRAs (Lall 2012). As a result, Basel II provided that banks could, upon 
application, use their own internal rating procedures.
This development underlines how functional drivers of regulatory use were 
conditioned by the preferences and lobbying pressure of potential targets, such 
as transnational banks, and broader affected constituencies (i.e., losers from the 
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regulatory use of credit ratings such as European SMEs). These political pres-
sures played a noteworthy part in shaping the extent to which regulators eventu-
ally relied on CRAs.
How regulatory use empowered CRAs
The “hard-wiring” of credit ratings into financial regulation has both boosted 
CRAs’ private sources of power and conferred regulatory authority to CRAs. It 
had both direct (delegating) and indirect (endorsing and supporting) effects, 
amounting to the public empowerment of CRAs as regulatory intermediaries.
CRAs are not just commercial information providers, but governance actors 
capable of wielding authority (Cutler, Haufler, and Porter 1999; Sinclair 2005). 
By defining and monitoring criteria of credit risk for investors and borrowers 
around the world, CRAs have established a nearly global private standard of 
credit-worthiness.
This standard is first of all backed by CRAs’ own expert authority and legiti-
macy in the eyes of financial market actors (Nölke 2004, 163–64). Because of 
CRAs’ presumed expert status, investors rely extensively on credit ratings for 
screening nontransparent capital markets. Borrowers are aware of CRAs’ pub-
lished criteria for credit-risk assessment and adjust their behavior to those crite-
ria, as ratings are vital for borrowers’ financing conditions and access to capital. 
Both investors and borrowers are dependent on CRAs—for analytical resources 
and credibility, respectively—leading them to recognize CRAs as private authori-
ties. In sum, CRAs begin with genuinely private, state-independent power: epis-
temic authority, enhanced by the “moral authority of the non-state, 
non-self-interested referee” (Bruner and Abdelal 2005, 191; Porter 2010, 59), 
and the resulting structural power as gate-keepers of global financial markets. 
These are important sources of power: even without delegated public authority, 
they might have been sufficient to give CRAs an influential role in governing 
disintermediated financial markets.
Nonetheless, public regulatory empowerment provides a second major source 
of CRAs’ power, which not only builds on but interacts with and multiplies CRAs’ 
independent power. when financial regulations rely on credit ratings, they rein-
force the authority and the perceived reliability and legitimacy of CRAs. 
Regulatory use not only reflects the market norm and practice of relying on 
CRAs, it also promotes the entrenchment of credit ratings in market practices.
As public regulators have come to realize, the regulatory use of credit ratings 
signals to investors that it is safe to rely on CRAs’ risk assessments: if private 
credit ratings are deemed sufficiently reliable for regulatory purposes, they 
should also be adequate for making investment decisions. Moreover, the regula-
tory use of credit ratings has a direct effect on CRAs’ power. The public regulator 
makes CRAs’ private standard of credit-worthiness legally binding; compliance 
with the standard becomes mandatory (Kerwer 2005; Nölke 2004). Thus, “ratings 
are given the force of law” (Bruner and Abdelal 2005, 191).
This delegation entrenches the structural power position of the few recognized, 
incumbent CRAs as gatekeepers. It renders ratings more valuable in the financial 
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system and provides a lucrative boost to CRAs’ business (Bruner and Abdelal 2005, 
193; Darbellay 2013, 45). It may also attenuate reputational pressures to ensure 
high informational quality and credibility, since, at the extreme, the business of 
recognized CRAs shifts from providing credit information to selling “regulatory 
licenses” (Partnoy 2009) that issuers have to buy. Finally, regulatory use damages 
competition: it creates regulatory barriers to entry and reinforces an effective oli-
gopoly of recognized and regulation-eligible market incumbents.
Postcrisis Reform Efforts and the Persistent  
Power of CRAs
CRAs contributed to the emergence and spread of the global financial crisis by 
greatly underestimating the credit risk of “toxic” structured finance products 
such as mortgage-backed collateralized debt obligations (Porter 2010, 69; 
Brunnermeier et al. 2009, 54). This “rating fiasco” (Kruck 2016) highlighted 
underlying structural pathologies, including persistent flaws and a lack of trans-
parency in rating methodologies and models, little legal accountability for ratings, 
an oligopolistic market structure, and especially the conflicts of interest and col-
lusive behavior between CRAs and issuers (targets) that resulted from CRAs’ 
issuer-pays business model.
Regulators—including both elected legislators and nonelected federal agen-
cies such as the SEC—came to view extensive regulatory recognition as a mistake 
because it contributed to investors’ overreliance on CRAs (then-SEC chairman 
Cox in Ackermann 2008; see Darbellay 2013, 59; Pagliari 2012, 57). Moreover, as 
governments used taxpayer money to bail out financial institutions, financial 
regulatory politics became highly politicized; it became politically imperative for 
elected policy-makers to visibly disempower one of the main culprits of the finan-
cial turmoil (Pagliari 2012, 52). Despite their frustration with CRAs, however, 
regulatory agencies—aware of the costs and complications of conducting risk-
sensitive regulation without CRAs—were more hesitant to propose sweeping 
disempowerment. Legislators effectively overruled their concerns in the 2010 
Dodd-Frank Act; but the impracticality of radically moving away from credit rat-
ings became obvious as federal agencies struggled mightily to implement the 
relevant provisions of the Dodd-Frank Act.
Efforts to reduce regulatory reliance on CRAs
The SEC first issued several interrelated rules in 2009 to remove references 
to NRSROs from a number of securities regulations (Ackermann 2008; Pagliari 
2012, 57). But initially, no other federal agency followed suit. Even the SEC 
appeared inconsistent in its approach: in 2010, it also proposed regulations that 
would increase money market mutual funds’ reliance on ratings (white 2010, 
224). Federal agencies still hesitated to fully renounce the regulatory use of 
credit ratings because they had neither external alternatives ready nor 
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the “in-house” capacities to perform credit risk assessment. In early 2010, 
approximately 2,000 references to credit ratings could still be found in the U.S. 
Federal Register (Darbellay 2013, 60). Against this backdrop and due to growing 
public pressure, elected legislators took the regulatory initiative.
The resulting 2010 Dodd-Frank Act aimed at eliminating regulatory reliance 
on CRAs. It expressly removed statutory references to ratings. Moreover, it 
required every federal agency to review how existing agency regulations (where 
most references to CRAs could be found) relied on ratings. Federal regulators 
were then to remove regulatory reliance on ratings and replace them with alter-
native criteria within one year (Darbellay 2013, 61; European Commission 2013, 
3; SEC 2017). These provisions affected a broad range of regulators and targets 
in securities, banking, and insurance regulation, as the regulators for all major 
financial markets heavily relied on credit ratings.
Regulators had to look for substitutes, but these were hard to find. The rele-
vant provisions of the Dodd-Frank Act proved more difficult to implement than 
expected, and regulators soon delayed the implementation deadline. The SEC 
eventually managed to remove several sets of references to credit ratings in rules 
adopted in 2011 and 2013. But a substantial number of SEC rules remained 
unmodified, and other regulatory agencies also struggled to implement the 
Dodd-Frank requirements in consequential ways. As of the end of 2016, only a 
minority of CRA-related requirements spelled out in the Dodd-Frank Act had 
effectively been implemented by the competent regulators (SEC 2012, 2017).
Costs and complications of reducing reliance on CRAs
Implementation of the Dodd-Frank provisions was so difficult because, after 
decades of extensive use of credit ratings, regulators had become dependent on 
CRAs. Over time, relying heavily on CRAs’ resources for risk-sensitive regula-
tion, regulators had failed to nurture ready and affordable substitutes (Darbellay 
2013, 86; Hill 2011). As a result of these strong material path-dependencies, the 
costs of leaving the entrenched path of regulatory reliance and radically displac-
ing the incumbent intermediaries were very high.
One way to eliminate references to credit ratings would be to renounce risk-
sensitive regulations altogether. But regulators viewed it as imperative to stick 
with regulations that were contingent on targets’ exposure to credit risk and that 
adjusted to changing market circumstances. Uniform, non-risk-weighted regula-
tory requirements such as the Basel I capital reserve provisions had effectively 
encouraged riskier investments by banks to increase their returns on regulatory 
capital (Pagliari 2012, 48–49). The Federal Reserve Board warned that “section 
939A [of the Dodd-Frank Act] could reduce the risk sensitivity of bank risk-based 
capital ratios if risk weights become more uniform by asset class because work-
able alternatives cannot be found or are too costly” (Federal Reserve Board 2011, 
3). The board continued to advocate risk-sensitive regulation to discourage inves-
tors from taking on riskier assets, arguing that alternative measures of credit risk 
would have to reflect market developments quickly, adjust to new information, 
and may not increase the risk of regulatory arbitrage. Regulators also agreed that 
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references to credit spreads as a market-based substitute for credit ratings would 
only boost procyclical effects.
where they have adopted an alternative to external credit ratings, U.S. regulators 
have often enhanced the regulatory roles of banks and institutional investors. 
Regulators replaced a number of references to CRAs with regulatory recognition of 
banks’ internal rating procedures (e.g., to define risk-weighted capital requirements). 
In doing so, regulators passed the task of credit risk assessment to other private inter-
mediaries (banks’ internal rating units), which are subunits of the regulated tar-
gets (banks). This mode of governance might be represented as R → I = T or 
R → t → T where t ∈ T (see Abbott, Levi-Faur, and Snidal; Havinga and 
verbruggen, this volume). Evidently, a shift from reliance on external ratings by 
CRAs to internal ratings by banks does not entail a stronger positive role for the state.
However, this shift of intermediaries might make matters even worse in two 
ways. First, the internal rating-based approach would create significant difficul-
ties and costs for smaller, less sophisticated banks (Lall 2012, 630). Both regula-
tors and banks themselves expressed doubts about whether smaller financial 
institutions could do a better job of analyzing securities through internal ratings 
than CRAs did (Federal Reserve Board 2011, 4; Hill 2011, 144). Second, policy-
makers feared moral hazard of banks using exclusively internal ratings. As a 
result, regulators often refrained from fully replacing external credit ratings by 
CRAs with internal ratings by banks.
A shift to a direct R → T approach, in which regulators would produce risk 
assessments themselves, was not considered a serious option. This would have 
implied a government takeover of the credit rating business, with entities equiva-
lent to Moody’s or S&P’s replaced by a government agency. The (few) proposals 
pointing in this direction drew strong opposition from virtually all parts of the 
financial policy community. The main concerns were the high costs of setting up 
a public CRA, as well as the lack of in-house rating expertise and capacity within 
existing government agencies. The Fed bluntly argued that alternatives to credit 
ratings should “incorporate market participants’” views rather than only the 
supervisor’s view of creditworthiness. “Supervisors generally do not have the 
resources independently to rate the creditworthiness of individual assets on a 
regular basis across hundreds of regulated institutions” (Federal Reserve Board 
2011, 4). Moreover, the quality and credibility of ratings might suffer even more 
if they were issued by a state-run entity that lacked political independence.
Tellingly, the difficulties in the United States in implementing Dodd-Frank 
strongly informed the 2013 EU credit rating agency regulation (Kruck 2016). 
The EU was explicit that EU regulators did not want to rush a withdrawal of 
credit ratings from financial regulation, as the “experience in the U.S. has shown 
that it is difficult to remove references to ratings without having viable alterna-
tives in place” (European Commission 2013, 11).
Limited effectiveness of rescinding delegated authority
Even if these issues were transitional problems that could be resolved in the 
medium-term, significant barriers to the public disempowerment of CRAs would 
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still remain. Rescission of CRAs’ delegated authority would not only be costly and 
complicated. It would also have only a limited effect on CRAs’ de facto power. 
Again, the PDPS approach helps us to understand why this is so.
First, even after severe mistakes, CRAs possess their own private sources of 
profit, structural power, and expert authority, as they have never been fully 
dependent on regulatory recognition. They benefit from market actors’ sus-
tained, albeit grudging, recognition that it is hard to do business in current secu-
rities markets without CRAs’ assessments. Moreover, issuers continue to depend 
on ratings for access to the capital markets and viable financing conditions. And 
the level of competition among CRAs is still low. These factors limit the leverage 
regulators have over their intermediaries: their relationship is characterized by a 
low degree of hierarchy and CRAs’ power is pretty resilient to states’ rescission 
of delegated authority.
There is a second related complication—the sticky effects of public empower-
ment on CRAs’ power over market actors. CRAs not only continue to possess 
their own substantial sources of power and profit that predate public empower-
ment, extensive regulatory use has contributed to deepening and widening the 
historical embeddedness of CRAs in now deeply entrenched market practices. 
The key point here is that regulatory recognition did not just grant CRAs a cer-
tain amount of authority that can easily be deducted again; rather, it helped 
multiply CRAs’ power. Imagine that the use of credit ratings for a particular regu-
latory purpose entailed the transfer of ten units of power to CRAs. Say 25 years 
later, CRAs have used these ten units in interaction with their own sources of 
power to amass one hundred additional units of power. Rescinding the initially 
delegated ten units will hardly harm CRAs’ power now. To put it differently, 
CRAs have profited from the regulatory privilege that they enjoyed for decades 
to increase their state-independent power in financial markets and their resil-
ience to (threats) of rescission. How did that occur?
On one hand, regulatory use of credit ratings has promoted market actors’ 
dependence on CRAs’ analytical and operational resources and on their judg-
ments over access to capital markets. It has helped to put CRAs into a powerful 
structural position as indispensable experts and oligopolistic gate-keepers. Once 
entrenched, this dependence of targets and the structural power of CRAs will 
likely persist even if ratings-dependent regulations are withdrawn.
But to fully appreciate the stickiness of public empowerment, we need to go 
beyond material-structural effects to include ideational dynamics. Boosted by 
regulatory recognition, CRAs have consolidated their status as authoritative 
experts that frame understandings of risk measurement and management. Over 
time, investors’ reliance on CRAs’ risk assessments has turned into normalized 
behavior: “over the past decades behavioral reliance has added to regulatory reli-
ance” (Darbellay 2013, 86; see Partnoy 2009, 10). Even when severe rating mis-
takes should have been fresh on investors’ minds, they have continued to rely on 
CRAs. As long as investors do so, rather than demanding that issuers go else-
where for verification of their credit-worthiness, issuers too will be dependent on 
CRAs’ judgment (Hill 2011). Even after the financial crisis, CRAs’ position as 
authoritative judges of credit-worthiness is largely intact in the eyes of market 
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participants. After a strong dip in 2008, market shares and profit margins of the 
leading CRAs have risen again. Their assessments are still widely seen as conse-
quential; therefore, they must be taken into account when devising business 
strategies and financial policies.
Bankers and brokers themselves claim that market norms dictating the use of 
CRAs are sticky regardless of bad rating performance: “You basically have to go 
to Moody’s and S&P. …The market doesn’t accept it if you don’t go to both of 
them” (Dessa Bokides quoted in Hill 2011, 140). Market actors believe that they 
must continue to rely on the most prominent CRAs because other market partici-
pants are still doing so. These sticky beliefs, which amount to a collective self-
fulfilling prophecy, have contributed to the persistence of an oligopoly of failing, 
but still powerful CRAs. The market practice of relying on credit ratings is 
unlikely to disappear any time soon, even if formal regulatory references to credit 
ratings are removed (Partnoy 2009, 10). U.S. regulators have self-consciously 
admitted that, even without regulatory prescriptions, “as a practical matter … the 
large number of broker-dealers will continue to make use of NRSRO ratings. But 
they need not” (Sirri quoted in Ackerman 2008).4
Incremental reregulation of CRAs and its inadvertent effects
For all these reasons, regulators have been left with only one major alterna-
tive: incremental reregulation and shored-up oversight of CRAs. The Dodd-
Frank Act introduced a mandatory registration system, endowing the SEC with 
enhanced oversight and monitoring competencies. It also provided for stronger 
procedures by CRAs to deal with conflicts of interest; more independence in 
CRAs’ corporate governance; greater internal controls; and more extensive dis-
closure of data and assumptions underlying credit ratings, rating methodologies, 
and performance statistics (Hill 2011, 144). The SEC was further charged with 
prescribing standard requirements regarding rating procedures and methodolo-
gies (Darbellay 2013, 71). Finally, Dodd-Frank introduced an enhanced legal 
liability regime for CRAs. The EU adopted similar, or even more intrusive, rules 
in three regulations (2009, 2011, 2013).
while these rules may indeed constrain CRAs’ behavior, reregulation will not 
fundamentally curb the power of incumbent CRAs (Hill 2011). They may even 
have the opposite effect by entrenching CRAs’ status as private authorities, work-
ing at cross-purposes with the declared aim to reduce CRAs’ centrality (Kruck 
2016). Postcrisis regulation has failed to address the core conflict of interest aris-
ing from payment of CRAs by issuers. Intrusive regulation may also create regu-
latory barriers to entry by new CRAs, with negative effects on competition in the 
rating market (white 2010, 224).
Finally, reregulation inadvertently validates, rather than downgrades, CRAs’ 
status as important governance actors, rather than mere purveyors of opinions or 
mundane providers of services. It institutionally inscribes CRAs as flawed but 
indispensable gatekeepers that must (and can) be regulated and controlled to 
“function properly” and fulfil a systemic oversight function in financial markets. 
This is a high, if not delusional, regulatory ambition. Rather than reducing CRAs’ 
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centrality, shored-up regulation may encourage further overreliance on a small 
number of incumbent CRAs, as it gives “too much of an official endorsement to 
ratings” (Brunnermeier et al. 2009, 54) and reassures market actors of CRAs’ 
seeming trust-worthiness (Darbellay 2013, 86–87).
Conclusion: PDPS and the Intermediary  
Selection Dilemma
The above PDPS account of the crucial empowerment and the futile disempow-
erment of CRAs underlines that research that focuses solely on the extent of a 
delegation (principal-agent), or on the autonomous resources of an intermediary 
(private authority), or on the role of history and network effects (historical insti-
tutionalism) may miss important sequential and interactive relationships among 
these variables. Studying the interaction of these variables, rather than trying to 
isolate their individual importance, produces a comprehensive understanding of 
shifting power in RIT settings. This is all the more relevant because endogenous 
shifts of power among regulators, intermediaries, and targets over time, as well 
as material and ideational path-dependencies leading to a fundamental asymme-
try in the empowerment and disempowerment of private intermediaries, can be 
expected to characterize many other indirect governance arrangements beyond 
the specific case of CRAs.
An important implication of the PDPS argument is that regulators regularly 
face an “intermediary selection dilemma”: they will often have incentives to pick 
resource-strong intermediaries, which are recognized authorities and dispose of 
substantial material or immaterial capabilities. Acquiring capacities that regula-
tors need but do not possess themselves will often be the very rationale for enlist-
ing a particular intermediary. But regulators must also anticipate the negative 
effects that the choice of a strong and authoritative intermediary may have on 
later attempts to control that intermediary when the preferences of regulator and 
intermediary diverge.
Autonomous intermediary resources complicate (hierarchical) control. They 
render the relationship between regulators and intermediaries more horizontal 
than principal-agent models assume, limit the regulator’s influence on the inter-
mediary in an orchestration setting, and may induce the regulator to rely so heav-
ily on the intermediary that the regulator’s direct regulatory capacity is diminished 
over time. A dynamic conception of R → I → T relations helps us to understand 
how extensive and prolonged empowerment of an intermediary exacerbates the 
control problem: it allows the intermediary not only to preserve but also to 
expand its (power) resources, even as the regulator’s ability to displace the inter-
mediary is shrinking. Further comparative research testing the PDPS approach 
and focusing on different issue areas and intermediaries is clearly warranted to 
study how regulators deal with these dynamics and with the intermediary selec-
tion dilemma.
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Notes
1. Authority refers to recognized power (Zürn, Binder, and Ecker-Ehrhardt 2012). It denotes a par-
ticular type of power that is (at least in part) based on addressees’ recognizing that an actor can make 
competent judgments and binding decisions rather than on mere structural asymmetries or coercion. I use 
the term authority to emphasize the presence of an element of “recognition.” Otherwise, the more generic 
term power is used.
2. The gist of the PDPS argument should also apply beyond private intermediaries. However, as high-
lighted by researchers of private authority and in the relevant section of this article, RIT schemes with 
private intermediaries may be particularly likely to display path-dependent power shifts in favor of the 
intermediary, which is why my argument focuses on them.
3. SEC = U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, BCBS = Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision, EU = European Union.
4. Dessa Bokides is a high-level U.S. broker and banker. Eric Sirri was director (from 2006 to 2009) of 
the Division of Trading and Markets at the SEC, where he was responsible, among other things, for mat-
ters relating to CRAs.
References
Abbott, Kenneth, Philipp Genschel, Duncan Snidal, and Bernhard Zangl, eds. 2015. International organ-
izations as orchestrators. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Abbott, Kenneth, David Levi-Faur, and Duncan Snidal. 2017. Theorizing regulatory intermediaries: The 
RIT model. The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science (this volume).
Ackerman, Andrew. 2008. SEC votes to remove NRSRO from 38 rules. The Bond Buyer Online. Available 
from http://www.bondbuyer.com/article.html?id=20080625YA9RHPDA.
Bruner, Christopher J., and Rawi Abdelal. 2005. To judge Leviathan: Sovereign credit ratings, national law, 
and the world economy. Journal of Public Policy 4 (2): 191–217.
Brunnermeier, Markus, Andrew Crocket, Charles Goodhart, Avinash D. Persaud, and Hyun Shin. 2009. 
The fundamental principles of financial regulation. Geneva: International Center for Monetary and 
Banking Studies.
Büthe, Tim. 2002. Taking temporality seriously: Modeling history and the use of narratives as evidence. 
American Political Science Review 96 (3): 481–93.
Cantor, Richard, and Frank Packer. 1994. The credit rating industry. Federal Reserve Bank of New York 
Quarterly Review 19 (2): 1–26.
Cutler, Anne C., virginia Haufler, and Tony Porter. 1999. Private authority and international affairs. In 
Private authority and international affairs, eds. Anne C. Cutler, virginia Haufler, and Tony Porter, 
2–38. New York, NY: New York University Press.
Darbellay, Aline. 2013. Regulating credit rating agencies. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.
European Commission. 2013. Memo: New rules on credit rating agencies (CRAs) enter into force. Brussels: 
European Commission.
Farrell, Henry, and Abraham L. Newman. 2010. Making global markets: Historical institutionalism in 
international political economy. Review of International Political Economy 17 (4): 609–38.
Federal Reserve Board. 2011. Report to the Congress on credit ratings. washington, DC: Board of 
Governors of the Federal Reserve System.
Galland, Jean-Pierre. 2017. Big third-party certifiers and the construction of transnational regulation. The 
ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science (this volume).
Genschel, Philipp, and Bernhard Zangl. 2014. State transformations in OECD countries: Towards the state 
as a manager of political authority. Annual Review of Political Science 17:337–54.
Green, Jessica F. 2014. Rethinking private authority: Agents and entrepreneurs in global environmental 
governance. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Hall, Rodney B., and Thomas J. Biersteker. 2002. The emergence of private authority in the international 
system. In The emergence of private authority in global governance, eds. Rodney B. Hall and Thomas 
J. Biersteker, 3–22. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
ASYMMETRY IN EMPOwERING AND DISEMPOwERING PRIvATE INTERMEDIARIES 151
Havinga, Tetty, and Paul verbruggen. 2017. Understanding complex governance relationships in food 
safety regulation: The RIT model as a theoretical lens. The ANNALS of the American Academy of 
Political and Social Science (this volume).
Hawkins, Darren G., David A. Lake, Daniel L. Nielson, and Michael J. Tierney. 2006. Delegation under 
anarchy: States, international organizations, and principal-agent theory. In Delegation and agency in 
international organizations, eds. Darren G. Hawkins, David A. Lake, Daniel L. Nielson, and Michael 
J. Tierney, 3–38. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Hill, Claire A. 2011. Limits of Dodd-Frank’s rating agency reform. Chapman Law Review 15 (1): 133–48.
Kerwer, Dieter. 2005. Holding global regulators accountable: the case of credit rating agencies. 
Governance 18 (3): 453–75.
Kruck, Andreas. 2011. Private ratings, public regulations: credit rating agencies and global financial gov-
ernance. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
Kruck, Andreas. 2016. Resilient blunderers: Credit rating fiascos and rating agencies’ institutionalized 
status as private authorities. Journal of European Public Policy 23 (5): 753–70.
Lall, Ranjit. 2012. From failure to failure: The politics of international banking regulation. Review of 
International Political Economy 19 (4): 609–38.
Loconto, Allison Marie. 2017. Models of assurance: Diversity and standardization of modes of interme-
diation. The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science (this volume).
Lytton, Timothy D. 2017. The taming of the stew: Regulatory intermediaries in food safety governance. 
The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science (this volume).
Mahoney, James. 2000. Path dependence in historical sociology. Theory and Society 29 (4): 507–48.
Mattli, walter, and Tim Büthe. 2005. Accountability in accounting? The politics of private rule-making in 
the public interest. Governance 18 (3): 399–429.
Mattli, walter, and Jack Seddon. 2015. New organizational leadership: Nonstate actors in global economic 
governance. Global Policy 6 (3): 266–76.
Nölke, Andreas. 2004. Transnational private authority and corporate governance. In New rules for global 
markets: Public and private governance in the world economy, ed. Stefan A. Schirm, 155–75. 
Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
Pagliari, Stefano. 2012. who governs finance? The shifting public-private divide in the regulation of 
derivatives, rating agencies and hedge funds. European Law Journal 18 (1): 44–61.
Partnoy, Frank. 2009. Overdependence on credit ratings was a primary cause of the crisis. San Diego Legal 
Studies Paper No. 09-015. Available from http://ssrn.com/abstract=1430653.
Pfeffer, Jeffrey, and Gerald R. Salancik. 2003. The external control of organizations. New York, NY: Harper 
& Row.
Pierson, Paul. 2000. Increasing returns, path dependence, and the study of politics. American Political 
Science Review 94 (2): 251–67.
Porter, Tony. 2010. Risk models and transnational governance in the global financial crisis: The cases of 
Basel II and credit rating agencies. In Global finance in crisis: The politics of international regulatory 
change, eds. Eric Helleiner, Stefano Pagliari, and Hubert Zimmermann, 56–73. London: Routledge.
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). 2012. Report to Congress on assigned credit ratings, as 
required by Section 939F of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Customer Protection Act. 
washington, DC: SEC.
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). 2017. Credit rating agencies. washington, DC: SEC. 
Available from http://www.sec.gov/spotlight/dodd-frank/creditratingagencies.shtml.
Sinclair, Timothy J. 2005. The new masters of capital: American bond rating agencies and the politics of 
creditworthiness. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
Tallberg, Jonas. 2002. Delegation to supranational institutions: why, how, and with what consequences? 
West European Politics 25 (1): 23–46.
van der Heijden, Jeroen. 2017. Brighter and darker sides of intermediation: Target-oriented and self-
interested intermediaries in the regulatory governance of buildings. The ANNALS of the American 
Academy of Political and Social Science (this volume).
white, Lawrence J. 2010. Markets: the credit rating agencies. Journal of Economic Perspectives 24 (2): 
211–26.
Zürn, Michael, Martin Binder, and Matthias Ecker-Ehrhardt. 2012. International authority and its politi-
cization. International Theory 4 (1): 69–106.
